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10 November 1959

NSC BRIEFING

KHRUSHCHEV AND WORLD COMMUNIST GOALS

I. Moscow apparently providing foreign Communist parties with interpretation of Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" which is designed

A. as means of overcoming any confusion and apprehension within world Communist movement regarding long-range implications of policy,

B. as a guideline for lower-level party leaders, and

C. for propaganda use.

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II.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

major aims of Khrushchev's

present line are to isolate US from rest of world and gain time in which to build up Bloc's military and economic power.

A. Khrushchev's strategy said to call for preserving status quo for "seven years or so," after which Bloc will be so strong it will be able prevent "imperialist" intervention in countries where revolutions taking place.

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[Redacted]

B.

[Redacted]

Khrushchev's strategy

will lead eventually to "automatic" surrender of US after rest of world is Communist.

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. [ ]

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NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

AUTH: HR 70-2

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1. Major objective in achievement of this long-range goal is to convince American people they would be losers in any nuclear war.
  2. Soviets believe their sputniks and luniks have been successful to great extent in demoralizing American people.
- III. Kremlin is said to feel that "official circles" in US are now divided between those who favor coexistence with USSR and those who favor policy of maintaining tension.
- A. Major achievement of Khrushchev's visit to US described as his exploitation of this American "rift" over co-existence.
  - B. Visit said to have gained more backing from the "coexistence group," which in turn is said to command greater support from American people.
- IV. In essence, Khrushchev appears both sincere and deceptive in call for detente of sorts between East and West.
- A. He seeks a period of international stability and relative calm;
  - B. But he does so because he undoubtedly feels that this would result in a substantial accretion of power to Communist Bloc.
- V. Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October (discussed here last week) was consistent with this line, although much softened for public consumption.
- A. Note, however, that we have some reservations about his reported private views.

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- B. We also believe that Khrushchev may underestimate long-run effects--at home as well as abroad--of forces set in motion by developments in Soviet-US relations.

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